The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941 by Currie, David P.
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
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This is the latest in Professor Currie's continuing series on the historical
development of constitutional doctrine. In this article Professor Currie
surveys the major decisions of the Supreme Court between 1930 and
1941 in the area of criminal procedure, civil rights and civil liberties. In
the area of criminal procedure, Professor Currie concludes that in decid-
ing what procedures were required or forbidden by due process, histori-
cal inquiry was displaced by a fundamental-rights test. In the area of
civil liberties, Professor Currie concludes that the Court made modest
progress. Finally, Professor Currie concludes that the Court's most im-
portant civil liberties work during the period was in the area of freedom
of expression, assembly and religion.
Amid the thunder of the great economic controversies that de-
stroyed economic due process, the contract clause and the concept of
limited federal power,' the Supreme Court of the 1930s quietly began to
work on the agenda of the future: criminal procedure, civil rights and
civil liberties.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In 1856, the Court had defined due process of law in essentially his-
torical terms in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 2
Unless the challenged procedure conflicted with other provisions of the
Constitution itself, the question was whether it was in accord with "those
settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and stat-
ute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which
are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country."'3
Applying this test, the Court upheld a statute providing for summary
collection of money that a customs collector owed the United States, be-
cause such a procedure was sanctioned by practice both in England and
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank Geoffrey
R. Stone for valuable criticism and suggestions.
1. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-40, 54 U. Cm. L.
REV. 504, 507-16 (1987) [hereinafter Hughes 1].
2. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
3. Id. at 277.
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in the Colonies.4
Any implication of the converse proposition-that all procedural
rights sanctioned by history were indispensable elements of due pro-
cess-had been rejected in Hurtado v. California 5 in 1884. It was true
that "a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken
to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both
in England and in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing
else can be due process of law."' 6 Historical acceptance was a sufficient
but not a necessary condition of constitutionality; due process required
only such established procedures as were "fundamental." '7
On this basis, indictment, jury trial and the privilege against self-
incrimination had all been held to be outside the scope of the due process
requirement and thus inapplicable to the states.8 The essence of due pro-
cess, the Court said, was adequate notice and a hearing before an unbi-
ased and unintimidated judge with jurisdiction.9 Under Chief Justice
Hughes, however, while downplaying the historical dimension of the in-
quiry, the Court significantly expanded the list of due process
requirements.
4. Id. at 281-86. See D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 272, 276 n.304 (1985) (expressing doubts whether the due process clauses should
have been construed to limit legislative power at all).
5. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6. Id. at 528.
7. Id. at 535; D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 366-67.
8. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538 (indictment); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1900) (12-
member jury); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908) (self-incrimination); see also
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876) (due process does not embrace the right to jury trial).
9. See, e.g., Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900) (notice); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409,
413-15 (1897) (hearing); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523-32 (1927) (unbiased judge); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (mob domination); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878)
(dictum) (jurisdiction). Chief Justice Hughes wrote to refine the notion of bias in United States v.
Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 136-51 (1936). In Wood he held that absent a showing of actual bias the
presence of government employees on a criminal jury was forbidden by neither history nor justice
and thus offended neither due process nor the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. Both
Wood, 299 U.S. at 142-49, and Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (Sutherland, J.),
which allowed the defendant to waive a 12-member jury with government consent, stressed that the
principle Hurtado had ennnciated in the due process context applied to the explicit criminal jury
provisions as well; only the "essential" elements of the common-law right were preserved. Although
in Wood Hnghes argued that a similar test had been employed in applying the seventh amendment
provision that jury findings be reviewed only "according to the rules of the common law," 299 U.S.
at 143-44 (quoting Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)), the decisions
under that provision seemed to follow history much more closely, as the language of the clause itself
suggested, see, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-88 (1935) (Sutherland, J.) (5-4 decision
striking down an additur provision for avoiding a new trial for inadequate damages if the defendant
agreed to pay more than the jury had awarded, because the practice had been unknown in England
in 1791); Baltimore & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 659-61 (upholding a provision for jndgment
notwithstanding the verdict after reservation of ruling on motion for directed verdict, becanse simi-
lar practice had existed at common law).
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A. Powell v. Alabama.
The first example of this expansion was Powell v. Alabama, 10 a 1932
decision arising out of the notorious prosecution of seven young blacks-
who came to be known as the "Scottsboro boys"-for the rape of two
white girls on a freight train. Without reaching claims of discrimination
in jury selection and mob domination of the trial, the Court concluded
that due process required the state to permit the defendants to appear by
counsel and to provide legal assistance for those unable to obtain their
own.11
The first conclusion was relatively easy. Although English courts
had afforded no right to counsel in serious criminal cases at the time of
emigration, the English practice had been repudiated in the Colonies and
thus was not sanctioned by history in the sense of Murray's Lessee.
Moreover, given the helplessness of the layman accused of a crime, the
defect was fundamental in the Hurtado sense: "The right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel." 12 Finally, although one of the grounds given in
Hurtado for holding that due process did not include the right to an
indictment had been that a contrary holding would make redundant the
specific fifth amendment requirement of a federal grand jury, Justice
Sutherland rightly observed in Powell that later cases had shown such an
overlap not determinative; due process must in any event be given its
natural meaning. 13
The requirement that the state provide counsel was another story.
Sutherland nowhere asserted that colonial practice had required the gov-
ernment to pay for an attorney; most of the provisions he cited merely
recognized the right to employ one. 14 Rather, the basis for this decision
was simply that the right to appointed counsel, "at least in cases like the
present," was "fundamental." Every state required the appointment of
counsel at least in capital cases. If this universal practice did not "estab-
lish" the right, it surely "reflect[ed]" it. In any event, to condemn an
incompetent defendant to death without assigned counsel "would be lit-
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Sutherland, J., over dissents by Butler and McReynolds, JJ.).
11. Id. at 68-71. The dissents argued that counsel had actually been provided. Id. at 74.
12. Id. at 68-69.
13. See id. at 60-71 (citing for the last point decisions holding that due process prohibited the
states from infringing freedom of speezh or press or taking property without compensation).
14. See id. at 61-65. The one apparent exception was a Pennsylvania statute paraphrased as
providing "that in capital cases learned counsel should be assigned to the prisoners." It is possible
that other provisions such as those granting simply a "right to counsel" had been construed to
require the state to provide attorneys, but Sutherland did not say they had.
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tie short of judicial murder." 15
Unlike the conclusion that due process required an opportunity to
employ counsel, the requirement that the state provide counsel seemed to
turn the Hurtado test on its head. Hurtado had introduced the funda-
mental-rights test as a means of denying rights historically afforded;
Powell employed it to grant rights historically denied. 16
B. Later Cases.
Mooney v. Holohan 17 and Brown v. Mississippi, 18 while adding that
knowing use of perjured testimony and reliance on a coerced confession
were also fundamental flaws, suggested a narrow interpretation of the
new test. Like a trial without counsel or dominated by a mob, trial on
the basis of coerced or perjured testimony was a mere "pretense." 19 In
effect, the Court was saying, the defendants had received no hearing at
all; and the right to a hearing had always been an essential element of due
process. 20 Thus, even if there was no historical support for the particular
requirements announced in these cases, they might all be viewed as im-
plicit in the historical and fundamental right to a "hearing," and the
Hurtado test arguably had not been perverted after all.
The trouble with this reasoning is that, at least with regard to the
right to assigned counsel, it seems to contradict the historical under-
standing of what constituted a hearing. The issue of mob domination
could have been fitted within the historical requirement of an impartial
arbiter, and the common law had excluded coerced confessions. 21 No
departure from history was thus required to outlaw them. It was other-
15. Id. at 72-73. The central argument of the opinion seems equally applicable to any serious
criminal case, although the Court's appropriate insistence that it was deciding only the case before it
and its observation that counsel was necessary "above all" because the defendants stood "in deadly
peril of their lives," id. at 71, furnished a handhold for a narrower reading. Nor should the require-
ment that counsel be provided at state expense be taken to expand the holding of Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921), that a state deprived a person of life or property by its failure to affirmatively
protect him, 257 U.S. at 328-30; in Powell the state, by virtue of its criminal prosecution, was ac-
tively seeking to deprive the defendant of his life, 287 U.S. at 46. See Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. 65, 71-76 (discussing Truax) [hereinafter Taft]; Currie,
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 873-74 (1986).
16. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85, 106 ("Hurtado...
give[s] no support to judicial augmentation of historically recognized procedures.").
17. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (perjured testimony).
18. 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (Hughes, C.J.) (confession obtained by physical torture).
19. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940), Justice Black applied Brown to con-
fessions obtained by six days of repeated questioning. There was no suggestion that the same reason-
ing would apply to a voluntary confession, which would render the trial an even more foregone
conclusion; the distinction may lie in the realm of waiver.
20. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
21. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 264-65 (1985).
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wise, however, with the right to assigned counsel. The materials cited in
Powell suggested that no such right was implicit in the historical concept
of a hearing.
In any event, the language of the opinions suggests that the question
whether an alleged right was "fundamental" had basically displaced the
historical inquiry it had been designed to accompany. In 1937, JusticeCardozo's famous opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 22 permitting the state
to appeal a conviction for a lesser crime than had been sought, lent force
to this conclusion by announcing that due process embraced all require-
ments of the Bill of Rights that were "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'23 Even long-established procedures, it seemed, were now sub-
ject to scrutiny for their compatibility with contemporary notions of fair
play. 24
Once Hurtado had concluded that the framers did not mean to bur-
den us with unnecessary anachronisms, one might plausibly have argued
that they would not have wanted to subject us to unfair ones either. It
was true that the particular vice of holding all common-law rights pro-
tected was not something that legislatures could correct. 25 Nothing in
the Constitution, however, appeared to inhibit legislatures from affording
additional rights. It might be argued that those intent on protecting ex-
isting fundamental rights from legislative interference would not have
trusted legislators to remedy past inadequacies, though the open-ended-
ness of the resulting judicial authority might have furnished a basis of
22. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (over unexplained dissent of Butler, J.).
23. Id. at 325. See also id. at 328 ("Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has
subjected [the defendant] a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?...
The answer surely must be 'no.' "); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 115 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
over dissent by Roberts, J., with Brandeis, Sutherland and Butler, JJ., concurring in the dissent)
(holding that the defendant need not be present when a jury viewed the scene of the crime: "There
can be no sound solution without an answer to the question whether in the particular conditions
exhibited by the record the enforced absence of the defendant is so flagrantly unjust that the Consti-
tution of the United States steps in to forbid it.").
24. See Nutting, The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Cases, 3
U. Cm. L. REv. 244, 254 (1936) (arguing that under decisions of the Hughes period any state
measure offended due process "the effect of which is to deprive the accused of what the Supreme
Court of the United States may regard as a fair trial"); cf Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940) (Douglas, J.) (undertaking no historical analysis in holding that civil jurisdiction of state
court based upon out-of-state service on domiciliary of forum state satisfied "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" and noting that "lt]he state which accords him privileges and af-
fords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties");
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (undertaking no
historical analysis in holding that administrative reliance on information not revealed to the parties
for possible rebuttal denied a litigant "[t]he fundamentals of a trial").
25. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529 ("[T]o hold that [settled usage] is essential to due process of law,
would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or
improvement.").
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distinction. What was most striking was that the Court made no attempt
to explain or to justify the momentous change it appeared to be
making.26
II. CIVIL RIGHTS
The central purpose of the Civil War amendments, as the Court
stressed in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 27 was to put an end to state dis-
crimination against blacks.28 Under Chief Justices Waite and Fuller, the
Supreme Court had condemned the exclusion of blacks from juries and
of Chinese from the laundry business and established that equality did
not preclude separation.29 Under Fuller and White, it had struck down
peonage and grandfather clauses and held that racial zoning, despite its
apparent conformity with the separate-but-equal doctrine, deprived land-
owners of property without due process of law.30 Under Chief Justice
Taft, it had held that the state could not exclude blacks from voting in
political primaries. 31 In contrast to the whirlwind of activity that had
characterized fourteenth amendment litigation in other fields, that was
about all the Court had to say about race before 1930.
A. Juries, Grandfathers and Schools.
Under Chief Justice Hughes, the Court made modest progress. The
Justices exhibited what seemed to be an increased willingness to scruti-
nize records for proof of discrimination against blacks in the selection of
juries.32 Lane v. Wilson 33 belatedly struck down Oklahoma's effort to
26. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 108-09.
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72, 81 (1873).
28. See D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 342-51 (discussing the Slaughterhouse Cases).
29. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (black jurors); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese laundries); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding
segregated trains); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (criminal statute separately defining inter-
racial offense not racially discriminatory where same punishment prescribed for both races). See
generally D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 383-90 (discussing Strauder, Yickvo and Pace); Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 324, 369-70 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller 1] (discussing Plessy).
30. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (peonage); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207 (1905) (peonage); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (grandfather clause);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racial zoning). See generally Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1132-38 [hereinafter White] (discussing Bai-
ley, Guinn and Buchanan).
31. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (white primary). See generally Taft, supra
note 15, at 70-71 (discussing Nixon).
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (Black, J.); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) (Black, J.); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per curiam); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295
U.S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (Hughes, C.J.); Nutting, supra
note 24, at 250-51. The Chief Justice made clear in Norris that Supreme Court review in these cases
extended to state court findings of fact where necessary to ensure that constitutional rights had not
Vol. 1987:800]
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evade the grandfather clause decision. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada34 put teeth in the requirement that separate facilities be equal by
holding that a state with a law school of its own could not require a black
to go beyond its borders to study law, even if it paid his expenses.
Chief Justice Hughes easily could have based this last conclusion on
the convincing argument that a legal education outside the state was ob-
jectively disadvantageous, 35 but he selected a broader ground. Whether
or not opportunities elsewhere were as good as those in Missouri,
[t]he white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the
negro resident having the same qualifications .. must go outside the
State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the
enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and the provi-
sion for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove
the discrimination. 36
Earlier cases, both in and out of the area of race, had held that it
was sufficient, for fourteenth amendment purposes, if one class of persons
was treated as well as another, even if its members were afforded different
privileges. 37 By declining to follow this principle, the Court seemed to
lay the foundation for an attack on the doctrine of separation itself,
which Hughes distinguished on the unpersuasive ground that "the obli-
gation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed
only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. ' 38
been denied. 294 U.S. at 589-90. See also Pierre, 306 U.S. at 358 ("[W]hen a claim is properly
asserted.., that a citizen whose life is at stake has been denied the equal protection of his country's
laws on account of his race, it becomes our solemn duty to make independent inquiry and determina-
tion of the disputed facts ....").
33. 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., over dissents by McReynolds and Butler, JJ.). The
new provision required those who had not voted in 1914 to register within 12 days or forever be
disenfranchised. "The practical effect... was to accord to the members of the negro race.., not
more than 12 days within which to reassert constitutional rights which this Court found in the
Guinn case to have been improperly taken from them." Id. at 276.
34. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Hughes, C.J., over a dissent by McReynolds, J.).
35. See id. at 349 (noting "the opportunities for the particular study of Missouri law and for the
observation of the local courts" and adverting to "the difference in distances to be traveled"--whose
impact in terms of personal and professional contacts, it should be added, is not covered by payment
of travel expenses.).
36. Id. at 349-50.
37. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (separate railroad cars for different races);
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879) (separate courts for different regions of state with one region
having no right of appeal to the state's Supreme Court); D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 388-89 & n. 145
(discussing various meanings of equality).
38. 305 U.S. at 350. See R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 211 (1960) ("The
Missouri decision signalized a new judicial mood toward Negro rights.").
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B. White Primaries.
Equally interesting was the 1932 decision in Nixon v. Condon 39 that
a black could not be denied the right to vote in a primary election in
Texas. An earlier decision so holding had been relatively easy, for the
state itself had excluded blacks from the primary by statute.40 Thereaf-
ter, however, the statute had been amended to permit each party's State
Executive Committee to prescribe qualifications for participation in its
primaries. 41 It was contended with some force that because it was now a
party rule that excluded blacks, the state was no longer responsible and
that only the state was forbidden to deny equal protection. 42
The Court's rejection of this argument rested on the fact that the
statute had vested in the State Executive Committee a power to act on
behalf of the party. The party itself had given its committee no such
authority. Thus, the Court concluded, the committee had acted "not as
the delegates of the party, but as the delegates of the State."'43
The possible implications of this reasoning were sweeping. If a spe-
cial authorization to make rules for the party was enough to make the
committee a state agent, the same might arguably be said of general laws
recognizing the power of a majority of the members to do so. This could
mean that every act of a state-chartered corporation might be held to be
that of the state.44
Three years later, in Grovey v. Townsend, 45 the Court unanimously
recoiled from this implication, holding that a resolution of the Demo-
cratic party convention excluding blacks was not state action despite the
existence of state laws providing for the election of convention delegates.
Nor was it enough to make the state responsible for the party's discrimi-
nation, wrote Justice Roberts, that the state extensively regulated pri-
mary elections, that a state officer had refused the petitioner his ballot in
reliance on the party resolution, or that "in Texas nomination by the
Democratic party [was] equivalent to election."'46
39. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
40. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
41. See 286 U.S. at 82.
42. See id. at 83; id. at 89-106 (McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ.,
dissenting).
43. Id. at 85.
44. In response one might argue that the authority of a majority to govern the party came not
from the law of voluntary associations, but from the agreement of the members, and that the state
was no more responsible for this decision than for any other private agreement it might recognize as
legally binding.
45. 295 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1935) (Roberts, J.).
46. Id. at 54. For a contemporaneous argument to the contrary, see Evans, Primary Elections
and the Constitution, 32 MICH. L. REV. 451, 462 (1934).
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In making such a nice distinction between the two cases, the Court
foreshadowed future difficulties in drawing the line between public and
private discrimination. It also made clear that the Nixon holding had
been much less revolutionary than it might at first have appeared. For
the time being, the southern states remained at liberty to render the fif-
teenth amendment hollow by allowing the dominant political party to
exclude blacks from the only election that mattered.4 7
III. CIVIL LIBERTIES
Apart from the economic cases, the most important developments in
constitutional law during the 1930s concerned the first amendment free-
doms of expression, assembly and religion.
A. Applicability to the States.
The first amendment, the Court had held, applied only to the federal
government-as its language and history made abundantly clear.48 In
Meyer v. Nebraska, 49 however, the Court had declared in dictum that
"the right of the individual ... to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience" was among the "libert[ies]" protected against
state infringement by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.50
In Gitlow v. New York, 51 the majority had expressly assumed, without
deciding, that the same was true of freedom of speech and the press; in
Whitney v. California, 52 it had rejected a challenge to a state law without
alluding to the question. l7ske v. Kansas53 had actually overturned a
47. Another device commonly employed to disenfranchise blacks survived judicial scrutiny
when the Court upheld a statute conditioning the right to vote on payment of a poll tax in Breedlove
v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (Butler, J.). The complaining party in this case was white, and no
argument of disguised racial motive was addressed. "Exaction of payment before registration," the
Court said, "undoubtedly serves to aid collection from electors desiring to vote." Id. at 283. A later
generation ofjudges, still without entering the thicket of legislative motives, would find this an inad-
equate reason for discriminating among otherwise eligible voters. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The exception of nonvoting women from the poll tax, Justice Butler
added, was justified by the "burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation of the race."
Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 282.
48. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845) (free exercise of religion). The
first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law .... U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis
added); cf Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the fifth amendment does
not apply to the states). See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 189-93 (discussing Barron and
the applicability of the amendments to the states).
49. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
50. Id. at 399. See also Taft, supra note 15, at 80-82.
51. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Holmes, in dissent, flatly asserted that the Court's assumption
was correct. Id. at 672.
52. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Brandeis, in a separate concurring opinion, reaffirmed the answer
Holmes had given in Gitlow. Id. at 373.
53. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
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state conviction that had been attacked on speech grounds without say-
ing whether the basis of decision was freedom of expression or a proce-
dural requirement of evidence to support the charge.5 4 Under Chief
Justice Hughes, the Court turned these intimations into clear holdings
and extended them.55
Before his first term was over, Hughes wrote for the Court in
Stromberg v. California 56 to strike down a state law as an infringement of
the freedom of speech. He relied wholly on precedent to show that this
guarantee applied to the states: "It has been determined that the concep-
tion of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment embraces the right of free speech."' 57 Cited for this conclusion were
Gitlow, Whitney and Fiske, none of which had addressed the issue explic-
itly. Thus the important and debatable conclusion that the fourteenth
amendment protected speech against state abridgement entered the law
without ever having been explictly justified in a majority opinion.
Two weeks later, in Near v. Minnesota, 58 Hughes cited the same
three precedents, as well as Stromberg, as having established that free-
dom of the press was likewise protected against the states, though only
Gitlow had so much as mentioned the press. This time he offered some-
thing resembling a reason for the conclusion: "It was found impossible
to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left un-
protected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and
property. ' '59
Justice Sutherland was more explicit in Grosjean v. American Press
Co. 60 in 1936. Powell v. Alabama, he said, had held that due process
made those Bill of Rights provisions that were "fundamental" applicable
to the states, and speech and press freedoms were as fundamental as the
right to counsel. Thus, in determining what liberties the clause pro-
tected, the Court, without explanation, employed the test it had devel-
oped for determining what process was due when those liberties were
taken away.
54. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 966
(1986). These decisions are discussed in Taft, supra note 15, at 82-91.
55. See Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 497, 515-16
(1942).
56. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
57. Id. at 368. Justices McReynolds and Butler, dissenting, did not think it necessary to reach
the question. Id. at 370-76.
58. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ("It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of
speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from invasion by state action.").
59. Id. at 707.
60. 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
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De Jonge v. Oregon 61 added freedom of assembly to the list of incor-
porated freedoms in 1937. "The right of peaceable assembly," wrote the
Chief Justice, "is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press
and is equally fundamental. ' 62 Finally, in Cantwell v. Connecticut 63 in
1940, the Court for the first time invalidated state action as an infringe-
ment of religious freedom, citing a speech case for the overbroad conclu-
sion that "[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the
Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 64
The best explanation for all this remained that given by Justice
Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney: once "liberty" had been
misconstrued to include freedom of contract, there was no reason to ex-
clude other rights that were equally important. 65 Thus, the application
of the first amendment to the states rested on the same sandy foundation
that supported Lochner v. New York;66 yet the Court vigorously extended
the former as it dismantled the latter, with little attention to the apparent
inconsistency. 67
B. Political Dissent.
Most of the freedom of expression cases decided before 1930 had
involved political dissent, which Justice Brandeis had suggested lay at
the heart of the first amendment. 68 In these decisions, despite varying
formulations of the governing standard, the Court had seemed to exercise
considerable restraint in reviewing both state and federal convictions for
61. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
62. Id. at 364.
63. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
64. Id. at 303 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939)). Justice Butler had declared
religious liberties protected in equally conclusory terms in Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934), in which the challenged requirement was upheld.
65. 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).
66. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. As an original matter there was a stronger though not conclusive case for incorporation of
the first amendment through the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, but
that argument had been decisively rejected in The Slaughterhouse Cases half a century before. See
D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 342-5 1, 363-64 (discussing the Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872), and subsequent decisions).
68. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence
... valued liberty both as an end and as a means.... They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth
.... ); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone, C.J.)
(assimilating "restraints upon the dissemination of information" to "legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (describing freedom of speech
and thought as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
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speech thought to be subversive.69 The 1930s witnessed the blossoming
of speech protections outside this traditional field, as we shall see; but
they also produced three decisions suggesting a significant trend toward
stricter scrutiny of punishment for allegedly subversive expression.
1. Herndon v. Lowry. The least revolutionary of these decisions,
Herndon v. Lowry,70 was the last. Herndon had been convicted of the
statutory offense of attempting to incite insurrection. 7' Gitlow seemed to
establish that such a statute was constitutional whether or not a particu-
lar attempt was likely to succeed. 72 Gitlow, however, had been found
responsible for distributing a revolutionary "manifesto. ' 73 Unlike the
four dissenters, 74 Justice Roberts reasonably, if rather strictly, concluded
that Herndon's mere possession of somewhat similar pamphlets did not
prove he had distributed them.75
On this view of the evidence, Herndon had been convicted for mere
solicitation of members for the Communist Party. That, Roberts con-
cluded, was not enough to prove him guilty of incitement to insurrection,
and thus the conviction was unconstitutional.76 This technique had been
employed in 1927 in Fiske v. Kansas, 77 which struck down a conviction
for incitement to violent overthrow of government for want of evidence
that the organization for which the defendant solicited members had in
fact advocated violence. Fiske had said only that such a conviction "un-
warrantably infring[es] the liberty of the defendant in violation of the due
process clause."'78 Herndon, without explanation and without citing
Fiske, based its conclusion squarely on freedom of speech and
assembly.79
This clarification was an important step, and the Court's willingness
to scrutinize the record for inadequate evidence, like that in Fiske, con-
69. See cases cited supra notes 51-53; White, supra note 30, at 1145-55 (discussing Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)).
70. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
71. Id. at 243.
72. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669-70 (upholding conviction under statute outlawing advocacy of
forcible overthrow of government).
73. Id. at 655-59.
74. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 274-75 (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 259-60.
76. Id. at 261 ("His membership in the Communist Party and his solicitation of a few members
wholly fails to establish an attempt to incite others to insurrection.").
77. 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927).
78. Id. at 387.
79. The Court stated:
If the evidence fails to show that he did so incite, then, as applied to him, the statute
unreasonably limits freedom of speech and freedom of assembly .... In these circum-
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trasted sharply with its refusal to do so in Whitney. 80 The Court made
clear, however, that it was not saying the state could not make mere
solicitation for the Communist Party a crime. Since the legislature had
not done so, there was no occasion for the broad deference to legislative
judgment that had been practiced in Gitlow. 8 1 Even if the legislature had
specifically prohibited such solicitation, Roberts warned, the punishment
inflicted would have to "find its justification in a reasonable apprehension
of danger to organized government"; for this additional limitation he
cited the earlier case of De Jonge v. Oregon. 82
2. De Jonge v. Oregon. De Jonge had been convicted for assist-
ing in the conduct of a meeting called by the Communist Party.83 In
contrast to Herndon, the legislature had explicitly made this conduct a
crime;84 the Court unanimously held that by doing so the legislature it-
self had gone too far.
There was nothing in the record in De Jonge to indicate that the
meeting had been called to further subversive goals. For all that ap-
peared, the defendant might have been convicted for assisting in the con-
duct of a meeting "to discuss the tariff, or the foreign policy of the
Government, or taxation, or relief, or candidacies for the offices of Presi-
dent." 85 It was one thing to outlaw actual incitement to revolution, as in
Gitlow, or knowing assistance in setting up a revolutionary organization,
as in Whitney. 86 Mere assistance in the conduct of a communist-run
meeting was another matter. "The question ... is not as to the auspices
under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the rela-
tions of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds
of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. '87 Because
"peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime," the
stances, to make membership in the party and solicitation of members for that party a
criminal offense... is an unwarranted invasion of the right of freedom of speech.
301 U.S. at 259-61. The Court added that the statute itself was unconstitutionally vague because it
"does not furnish a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt." Id. at 261.
80. 274 U.S. at 367 (dismissing an objection to statutorily required finding of knowledge of an
organization's subversive goals as "involving... no constitutional question whatever," but softening
the blow by observing that the jury finding had been "sustained by the Court of Appeals over the
specific objection that it was not supported by the evidence"); cf Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
590 (1935) (aggressive approach to review of state court factfinding relevant to issue of discrimina-
tion in jury selection).
81. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 256, 260.
82. Id. at 258-59 (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
83. 299 U.S. at 357.
84. Id. at 356-57.
85. Id. at 363.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 365.
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statute was invalid as applied.18
As Hughes and Roberts argued, the results in De Jonge and
Herndon were not necessarily irreconcilable with Gitlow or Whitney.
They suggested, however, a new spirit of aggressiveness in reviewing both
legislative and judicial findings affecting expression that was more remi-
niscent of the separate views of Holmes and Brandeis in the earlier cases
than of the majority opinions they were protesting.
3. Stromberg v. California. Still more novel and far-reaching was
the earlier decision in Stromberg v. California, 8 9 which invalidated a state
statute forbidding the exhibition of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to
government. As in De Jonge, a decision of the legislature itself was
struck down, but the reason was far more radical.
Though the Court did not advert to it, there was an important
threshold question whether freedom of expression extended beyond the
spoken and written word to embrace visual symbols like the red flag. In
light of the first amendment's apparent purpose of encouraging the com-
munication of ideas, a powerful argument could have been made for
treating every method of communication as speech, 90 leaving the prob-
lem of unreasonably obstructive or dangerous means of communication
to be worked out along the lines soon to be developed for regulating the
time, place and manner of expression in words.91 Far from disputing
that the display of a red flag was speech, the state had proscribed it only
for the message it conveyed; and the Court took the state at its word.92
The flag in Stromberg had been raised at a children's camp in con-
nection with a pledge of allegiance "to the worker's red flag, and to the
cause for which it stands; one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the
working class."' 93 The Court might easily have held, as in De Jonge, that
the statute could not validly be applied to such an innocuous event as
that shown by the record. Yet Chief Justice Hughes selected a broader
88. Id.
89. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
90. See Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 63, 79-80 (1968) ("If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates . . . it is
'speech.' ").
91. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding ban
on sleeping in park as applied to protest on behalf of homeless); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic
Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 61 (1973); Alfange, Free Speech and
Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 24-26; infra notes 122-52
and accompanying text.
92. See Nimmer, supra note 91, at 45 ("The state should not be heard to deny the actor's claim
that the conduct in question was intended to communicate if the state acted in order to suppress
such a communication.").
93. 283 U.S. at 362.
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ground. The statutory language was so sweeping, he wrote, that it might
be applied to "peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal
means" and thus to "conduct which [like the peaceable assembly in De
Jonge] the State could not constitutionally prohibit. ' 94 A statute "so
vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment" of such protected con-
duct, Hughes concluded without explanation, was "invalid on its face."'95
Thus, both Stromberg and De Jonge held that the state legislatures
had invalidly punished constitutionally protected conduct. There, how-
ever, the resemblance between the two decisions ends. De Jonge set aside
a conviction because the record did not show the defendant had done
anything that could constitutionally be punished; Stromberg did so with-
out examining the record because it would be unconstitutional to apply
the statute to someone else. 96
Even more striking was the contrast with Gitlow. In Gitlow the
Court had allowed punishment of an act assumed to be innocuous be-
cause other prohibited acts might be dangerous; in Stromberg it forbade
punishment of an act assumed to be dangerous because other prohibited
acts might be innocuous. Not a word was said to explain why the inva-
lidity of the statute as applied to others was relevant in Stromberg, or
why the Court sometimes took one approach and sometimes another.
Gitlow, however, had not denied that a statute that reached too
broadly would be unconstitutional. Because it had found the challenged
law valid, the Court in Gitlow had not had to face the severability ques-
tion that Stromberg posed: did an overbroad law have to be struck down
even as to activities that could validly have been forbidden, or could it be
cut down to constitutional size?
Stromberg's unexplained conclusion that the statute could not be
pared down echoed the decision in United States v. Reese, 97 which had
aborted a prosecution for infringing voting rights on racial grounds be-
cause the statute improperly forbade all interference with voting. 98 This
94. Id. at 369 (citing the state court opinion below, People v. Mintz, 62 Cal. App. 788, 290 P.
93 (1930)).
95. Id. at 369-70. Justices McReynolds and Butler argued in dissent that the validity of this
provision was not properly before the Court. Id. at 370-76.
96. The condemnation of the law as "vague and indefinite" reminds one of earlier decisions
outside the speech field striking down vague laws on due process grounds for failure to give fair
warning of what they forbade. E.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93
(1921). In Stromberg, however, the Court spoke not of fair warning, but of the impact of the statute
on the constitutionally protected right of political discussion. In the earlier cases, moreover, there
was no suggestion that one defendant was released because the law could not constitutionally be
applied to another. The overlap between the two doctrines is discussed in Note, The Void-For-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means to an End, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
97. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
98. Id. at 221-22.
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holding seemed peculiar in itself and has since ceased to be generally
followed.99 Moreover, Reese involved a federal statute, Stromberg a state
one. One would expect severability in the latter case to be a question of
state law. 100
Much later the Court would explain that the overbreadth doctrine,
first applied to slbeech cases in Stromberg, served to protect persons from
being deterred from protected expression because of the risk that it might
be found punishable. 10 1 If Hughes had something like that in mind he
kept it to himself, and he left his novel approach entirely unexplained.
C. The Press.
1. Near v. Minnesota. Herndon, De Jonge and Stromberg all in-
volved punishment for past expression. Near v. Minnesota 102 involved an
effort to prevent expression in the future.
Following a series of colorful articles charging public officials with
failure to enforce laws against organized crime, a state court had en-
joined the defendants from publishing, distributing or possessing any
newspaper that was "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." 10 3 In a
1931 opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held the statute author-
izing the injunction unconstitutional as applied. The difficult question in
the past, he said, had been whether freedom of speech was protected
against subsequent punishments; history showed that protection against
99. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960); D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 393-
95.
100. In commerce clause cases, for example, the Court had frequently struck down the applica-
tion of state statutes to particular transactions without suggesting that they could no longer be ap-
plied at all. See, e.g., Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 292-93 (1921) (state
may not require foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce to qualify to do business).
In other cases, moreover, the Court had expressly refused to consider whether a state statute that
could validly be applied to the case at bar would be invalid if applied to someone else. See, e.g.,
Yazoo & M. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912) (A provision requiring
prompt settlement of claims for lost freight was upheld as applied: "this court must deal with the
case in hand and not with imaginary ones."). But see Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV.
1, 6-14 (distinguishing Yazoo as a case that reached the Supreme Court "without any authoritative
construction of the statute by the state courts" and arguing that the Court regularly invalidates on
their face statutes overbroad as construed, because "a litigant ... can insist that his conduct be
judged in accordance with a rule that is constitutionally valid.").
101. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) ("This is deemed necessary because per-
sons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.");
see also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853 (1970) (dis-
cussing "chilling effect" of overbroad coverage). In equal protection cases it is immaterial whether
the conduct in question could have been prohibited by a different statute, but that is because the vice
toward which that clause was directed is inequality. A different argument is necessary to justify
facial review of statutes challenged on first amendment grounds.
102. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
103. Id. at 704, 706.
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"previous restraints" was at the heart of the first amendment. °4
In what sense, however, was the injunction a previous restraint? It
was true that, though based upon the finding that the defendant had pub-
lished offensive material before, 10 5 the injunction prohibited future publi-
cations on pain of contempt. A criminal statute embodying the same
prohibition, however, would likewise have prohibited future conduct, on
pain of criminal sanctions; and such a statute would be taken to impose a
threat of subsequent punishment, not a previous restraint. The Court did
not say in what respect the injunction posed a greater threat to freedom
of expression than would an ordinary criminal law.
The previous restraint condemned by Blackstone and others on
whom the Court relied had consisted of a licensing system forbidding
publication without prior official approval. 106 Licensing not only pre-
vents publication of punishable material; it delays publication of inoffen-
sive material as well, as the innocuousness of the publication is no
defense to the separate offense of publishing without a license. In a crim-
inal prosecution based upon the offensiveness of the publication itself, in
contrast, the defendant can escape punishment by showing that the pub-
lication was not prohibited. The principal vice of a previous restraint
thus seems to lie in the fact that it delays the publication of protected
materials until after their legality has been determined. 10 7
In this light, equating an injunction with licensing begins to make
sense. Unlike a criminal law, an injunction generally must be obeyed
until set aside even if it was invalidly entered, and protected speech may
therefore be delayed. 10 8
104. Id. at 713-15.
105. See id. at 735-36 (Butler, J., joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland, JJ.,
dissenting).
106. See, e.g., id. at 734-35 (Butler, J., dissenting) (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION § 1882 (1833)); see also Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 651 (1916) (arguing that the rule against previous restraints
ought not to be taken as precluding injunctions against defamation, because history shows the "main
purpose" to be "freedom from a regime of general censorship and license of printing"). For a chal-
lenging panoply of arguments why injunctions are less harmful to legitimate speech interests than
licensing, see Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subse-
quent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982).
107. See Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70
VA. L. REV. 53, 55-58 (1984). The purpose of the previous restraint rule is thus related to that of
Stromberg's overbreadth doctrine: both prevent certain methods of suppressing even those publica-
tions that constitutionally may be prohibited, in order to remove impediments to the publication of
protected materials. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 54, at
1036, 1046.
108. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293-95 (1947) (stressing overrid-
ing need for respect for judicial orders); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967)
(applying this rule in freedom of expression case); see also Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29
STAN. L. REV. 539, 552 (1977) (discussing Walker).
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It is true that the injunction appealed in Near had been issued only
after a trial. 10 9 It had not, however, been stayed pending appellate re-
view; and therefore it too posed the risk of delaying the publication of
information that ultimately might be held to be protected. It is also true
that in a contempt proceeding for violating the injunction the defendants
could have defended on the ground that the material published had not
been "malicious, scandalous or defamatory" within the meaning of the
order. They could not have done so, however, on the ground that those
terms were unconstitutionally broad, or that conduct falling within them
was constitutionally protected. Thus the effect of the injunction, like that
of a licensing law, seemed to be to postpone the publication of arguably
protected material until after a final determination of its acceptability;
the Court was right to treat it as a previous restraint.
Even previous restraints, the Chief Justice hastened to add, were not
always forbidden.
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against
obscene publications. The security of the community life may be pro-
tected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free
speech does not "protect a man from an injunction against uttering
words that may have all the effect of force." These limitations are not
applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the
extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect private
rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdic-
tion of courts of equity. 110
Several of these examples seemed to be, as Hughes argued, "excep-
tional cases," in which the interests requiring previous restraints could
fairly be described as overwhelming. Obscenity, however, hardly seems
to fall into that category.' The list of exceptions thus left the reader
wondering what was left of the supposedly powerful principle against
previous restraints and why the publication in question fell within it.
109. 283 U.S. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting) ("The restraint authorized is only in respect of con-
tinuing to do what has been duly adjudged to constitute a nuisance."). Upon filing of the complaint,
however, the trial court had also entered an order temporarily forbidding circulation. Id. at 704-05.
110. Id. at 716 (citations omitted).
111. The traditional justification for punishing obscenity is the perception that its social value is
slight. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[T]he lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words... arc no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."). The risk of delaying
protected publications may be an acceptable cost if the publication arguably endangers national
security; it is harder to justify if the publicaton is arguably worthless.
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As in Herndon v. Lowry, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Butler dissented. 112 It is interesting that the four Justices most zeal-
ous to discover infringements of economic liberties under the due process
clause were the least willing to find invasions of freedom of expression
under the same provision.
2. Grosjean v. American Press Co. The press won another great
victory in Grosean v. American Press Co., 113 in which Justice Sutherland
wrote for the whole bench in holding invalid a Louisiana tax measured
by the gross advertising receipts of newspapers distributing over 20,000
copies weekly. Taxes on newspapers, Sutherland noted, had been subject
to vehement opposition in England and in the Colonies because they
were a means of suppressing criticism of the government; they were
therefore at the heart of the guarantee of freedom of the press. 114
The tax in question was especially suspicious in that it applied only
to papers of large circulation, "with the plain purpose of penalizing the
publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspa-
pers." 115 The thrust of the opinion, however, was broader. Although
nothing the Court said was "to suggest that the owners of newspapers are
immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the
government," special taxes on the press alone were impermissible." 16
To the extent that he relied upon an unexpressed purpose to sup-
press publication, 117 Sutherland seemed to evince an unusual willingness
to look behind plausible revenue measures in search of impermissible mo-
tives. 118 Apart from motive, however, he seemed on sound ground in
terms both of history and of underlying policy in concluding that dis-
criminatory taxes had a forbidden deterrent effect on the press whether
or not they picked favorites among publishers. 119
112. 283 U.S. at 723-38. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing Herndon).
113. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
114. Id. at 246-49 (echoing the ancient Murray's Lessee decision, discussed supra note 2, in
insisting that the common law was a guide to the meaning of the Constitution only if "the common-
law rule.., be one not rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political conditions").
115. Id. at 251. See 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 721 (1951) (reflecting the popular
understanding that the case involved "Huey Long's tax on the... newspapers that were opposing
him").
116. 297 U.S. at 250.
117. "The tax ... is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to
be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled ...." Id. at 250.
118. Cf Hughes I, supra note 1, at 530 (discussing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287
(1935), which struck down a federal excise tax on persons selling liquor in violation of state law
because the law was based on an improper purpose).
119. Cf Reynolds v. United State;, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (employing similar nondiscrimination
test in applying first amendment ban on federal laws abridging free exercise of religion). The sugges-
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Not mentioned in Grosjean was the Court's departure from its inex-
plicable conclusion of thirty years before that, although corporations
were "persons" within the fourteenth amendment, they enjoyed none of
the "liberty" there protected. 120 Justice Black was soon to attack even
the accepted wisdom that corporations were "persons"; 121 though un-
willing to say why, the other Justices were moving in the opposite
direction.
D. Jehovah's Witnesses.
Presbyterians, on the whole, tend to keep their religion pretty much
to themselves. Jehovah's Witnesses, on the other hand, feel called upon
to convince others that their way is the right one. 122 In doing so, they
frequently have come up against general laws enacted to secure privacy,
clean and unobstructed streets, and public order. The result has been a
series of decisions, beginning in the 1930s, that have helped in no small
way to define the limits of constitutional protection of methods of propa-
gating ideas. 123
1. Permits. The story begins in 1938 with Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin, 124 in which the Court unanimously struck down an ordinance that
tion that the press enjoyed no blanket exemption from generally applicable laws was borne out by
the opinion in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (Roberts, J., over dissents by Suther-
land, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler, JJ.) that the Wagner Act's prohibition on firing em-
ployees for union activity could constitutionally be applied to a newsgathering service. Justice
Roberts stated that "[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws." Id. at 132-33. For justification of the distinction see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (reaffirming Grosfean) ("We need not
fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must
impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency. ... When the State singles out the press,
though, the political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general
applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute.").
120. See, e.g., Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); see also Fuller I, supra note 29, at 379 n.328
(describing Riggs and Greenberg as "peculiar and unexplained"). Without noticing Gros/ean, Justice
Stone repeated the earlier understanding in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (separate
opinion).
121. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
The initial decision that corporations were "persons" for fourteenth amendment purposes had been
made without discussion. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886).
122. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1941) (describing the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses as "a sect distinguished by great religious zeal").
123. See generally Barber, Religious Liberty v. Police Power: Jehovah's Witnesses, 41 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 226 (1947) (discussing the practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses and their frequent conflicts
with the law); Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 MINN. L. REv. 209
(1944) (crediting enlargement of constitutional liberty to propagate one's faith to the numerous Jeho-
vah's Witness cases decided by the Supreme Court).
124. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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forbade distribution of literature of any kind anywhere in the city with-
out a permit. More clearly than the injunction in Near, this was a classic
previous restraint. 2 5 History showed that freedom of the press em-
braced "pamphlets and leaflets" as well as "newspapers and periodicals,"
and that "[l]iberty of circulation [was] as essential .. as liberty of pub-
lishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little
value."' 126
Chief Justice Hughes did not say in Lovell why the distribution of
leaflets was not one of those "extraordinary" matters with respect to
which, he had said in Near, previous restraints were permitted. He did
point out that the ordinance was neither restricted "with respect to time
or place" nor "limited to ways [of circulation] which might be regarded
as inconsistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving dis-
orderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or lit-
tering of the streets."' 27 Whatever the evils the ordinance was designed
to prevent, Hughes seemed to be saying, the measure swept altogether
too broadly in achieving them.
The next year, in Schneider v. State, 128 the Court went further, strik-
ing down a licensing requirement that applied only to those who distrib-
uted literature door-to-door. Although trespasses and frauds could be
forbidden directly, wrote Justice Roberts, the greater efficiency of a per-
mit requirement did not "empower a municipality to abridge freedom of
speech and press."' 129
In thus begging the question, the Schneider opinion seemed to imply
that the marginal benefits of the permit system were insufficient to justify
its burdens on legitimate speech. Those burdens included not only the
delay that inheres in all previous restraints, but also the risk of discrimi-
nation resulting from the broad terms of the ordinance, which in the
Court's view gave the police "a discretion .. to say some ideas may,
while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens." 3°
125. Id. at 451-52.
126. Id. at 452 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)); see generally D. CURRIE,
supra note 4, at 442-43 (discussing Ex parte Jackson).
127. 303 U.S. at 451.
128. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion.
129. Id. at 164.
130. Id. The ordinance, as paraphrased by the Court, required the police to refuse a permit
upon finding "that the canvasser is not of good character or is canvassing for a project not free from
fraud." Id. at 158. The risk of discrimination posed by such a broad grant of discretion had figured
prominently in a flock of late nineteenth century state court decisions invalidating parade permit
ordinances on state law grounds. See, eg., In re Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396, 406-07, 30 N.W. 72,
76 (1886) ("If this were allowed ... , it would enable a mayor or council to shut off processions of
those whose notions did not suit their views or tastes, in politics or religion, or any other matter on
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To this reasoning one might plausibly respond that the Court should
wait to intervene until there is actual discrimination. The mere possibil-
ity that legislative authority might be misused, for example, does not out-
law its existence. The prophylactic rule adopted in Schneider, however,
had been employed in the equal protection context fifty years earlier as
an alternative ground in Yick Wo v Hopkins. 131 Although this rule had
not shown much vitality since Yick Wo, it might have been defended in
the context of Schneider as a corollary of the peculiar constitutional aver-
sion to previous restraints: because of the importance of not delaying
legitimate expression, delegations of authority to license speech must be
accompanied by unusually precise standards.1
32
The implication that some permit requirements might be constitu-
tional was borne out in Cox v. New Hampshire, 133 which upheld the con-
viction of five Jehovah's Witnesses for parading on the sidewalks without
a license. Traffic control, said the Chief Justice, was a legitimate state
concern. The possibility of administrative abuse was strictly limited by
the state court's holding that the officer issuing the permits was to con-
sider only the effect of the proposed parade on traffic. The requirement
that a permit be obtained in advance had "[t]he obvious advantage...
[of] giving the public authorities notice... so as to afford opportunity for
proper policing." 134
The Court thus confirmed the dictum in Near that not all previous
restraints were forbidden. It also confirmed the inference that the "ex-
traordinary" situations in which such restraints were allowed were not
limited to those in which there was a grave threat to national security; it
sufficed that previous restraint was reasonably necessary to the impartial
reconciliation of competing claims for the use of limited resources by
regulation of what the Court felicitously referred to as the "time, place
which men differ."); G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 85-96 (2d ed.
1981).
The unexplained observation in Schneider that the opinion was "not to be taken as holding that
commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance re-
quires," 308 U.S. at 165, was, perhaps, the Court's first suggestion that commercial speech might not
be entitled to the same protection as political or religious speech.
131. 118 U.S. 356, 366-73 (1886). See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 387 n.134 (discuss-
ing Yick Wo's alternative holding).
132. See Currie, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes: Amerikanische Analogien, in V. GoTz, H. KLEIN,
& C. STARCK, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG ZWISCHEN GESETZGEBUNG UND RICHTER-
LICHER KONTROLLE 68, 76-77 (1986).
133. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
134. Id. at 576. Compare Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 26 (describing Cox as "symboliz[ing] the ideal of Robert's Rules of Order" for
expression in public places) with Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and
Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937 (1983) (taking a more critical view of
Cox).
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and manner" of expression. 135 Not only are impartial time, place and
manner restrictions likely to serve legitimate interests unrelated to the
desire to suppress information, they also leave the speaker free to convey
his message in other ways.
2. Public Streets. The fact that a regulation impartially limits
only the time, place and manner of expression, however, does not assure
its constitutionality; the burden it places on means of communicating
protected messages may be out of proportion to the strength of the coun-
tervailing governmental concern. This limitation was appropriately illus-
trated by another aspect of Schneider v. State, when the Court also
struck down a collection of ordinances forbidding the distribution of
handbills on public streets and sidewalks. 136 "[T]he purpose to keep the
streets clean and of good appearance" by preventing littering, wrote Jus-
tice Roberts, was "insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a
person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing
to receive it."' 137 The unrealistic suggestion that this purpose could be
achieved by "punishment of those who actually throw papers on the
streets" 138 was surely unnecessary to this conclusion. If the question is
whether it is reasonable to weigh the risk of paper in the streets more
heavily than the benefits of handbilling, the only conceivable answer is
"no." 139
The more interesting question, however, is whether Justice Roberts
asked the right question. The city was the owner of the streets, and a
generation earlier-before it had held freedom of expression applicable to
the states-the Court had held in Davis v. Massachusetts that local gov-
ernments did not have to allow public property to be used for the com-
munication of ideas. 14° The government-as Justice Holmes had put it
for the state court in Davis-was as free to determine how its property
was to be used as was any private landowner. 141
135. 312 U.S. at 575. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729 (1978) ("The rela-
tive importance of the government's interests ... cannot explain the cases.").
136. 308 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1939).
137. Id. at 162.
138. Id. See Kalven, supra note 134, at 17 n.64 ("It is difficult to take seriously so impractical
an alternative.").
139. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 122, at 406 ("Handbills are almost the only available way for
poor men to express ideas to the public or announce a protest meeting."). But see Kalven, supra
note 134, at 18 (arguing that handbilling is "a method of communication of some annoyance to a
majority of people so addressed" and questioning its impact on its audience).
140. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
141. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897); cf McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (no
constitutional right to be a policeman). See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 442-44 (discussing
Ex parle Jackson and Ex parte Curtis); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith
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Holmes' argument clearly went too far. Governments, unlike
private parties, are subject to constitutional limitations, and as later
decisions correctly recognized, the selective denial of government benefits
can both distort the market for ideas and effectively punish the exercise
of a constitutional right.142 That was not what had happened in
Schneider; the question there was whether the government could impar-
tially deny everyone the use of the streets for the expression of ideas.
Justice Roberts treated the question lightly, saying only that "the
streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information
and opinion." 143 A few months before, in Hague v. CIO, 144 Roberts had
reached the peculiar conclusion that the nearly forgotten privileges or
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment gave citizens the right to
discuss federal legislation on the streets of Jersey City. In Hague, he had
been a little more expansive:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 145
All this was stated as a bald conclusion. Roberts cited no evidence
to support his historical assertion, and the mere fact that the streets had
traditionally been used for speech does not prove they must continue to
and the Bill of Rights, 1890-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 n.25 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller II]
(discussing Davis v. Massachusetts).
142. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political test for government employment).
See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189
(1983) (discussing the special vices of content-based restrictions).
143. 308 U.S. at 163.
144. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
145. Id. at 515. Only Justices Black and Hughes joined Roberts in this reasoning. Id. at 500,
532. Justices Stone and Reed, agreeing with the result, relied on the due process clause instead,
without explaining how the right of expression had been infringed, thus appearing to accept Roberts'
analysis under a different label. Id. at 500, 518-32. See Kalven, supra note 134, at 13 ("[Ilt is not
altogether clear for whom Mr. Justice Roberts was speaking ...."). Roberts' unorthodox approach
seems to have been attributable to the unjustified belief that the relevant jurisdictional statute applied
only to "privileges" and "immunities" despite its plain inclusion of "rights." See D. CURRIE, FED-
ERAL COURTS 535-38 (2d ed. 1975). Black's concurrence seems related to his later implication that
it might be the privileges or immunities clause that made freedom of expression and other guarantees
in the bill of rights applicable to the states. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting).
Despite Roberts' broad language about the public's right to use the streets for speech, Hague
could have been decided on narrower grounds. First, like the permit decision in Schneider, it in-
volved a licensing provision found to convey "arbitrary" power. Second, the court below had found
that a facially absolute ban on distributing literature had been administered in a discriminatory
manner. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 501, 505-06, 516.
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be. 146 Whether the streets are "held in trust for the use of the public"
would seem in the first instance to be a question of state law, which in
Hague was to the contrary. 147 Of course it was possible that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment had imposed a public trust for expression
purposes that overrode state law, but Roberts' historical explication was
not enough to show they had done so.
A more promising approach might have been to argue that the right
to speak on public streets was so essential to the effective communication
of ideas that a meaningful freedom of expression must be held to include
it.148 The possible implications of this approach, however, are momen-
tous. One might equally argue that the government must subsidize other
conduct it cannot prohibit, as all rights are hollow for those who cannot
afford to exercise them. If government may not forbid abortions, it must
pay for them; if it may not kill a man outright, it may not let him starve.
Some support for these conclusions might be drawn from the unex-
plained and striking holding of Truax v. Corrigan 149 that the state must
protect property rights from invasion by third parties.150 In accord with
the eighteenth-century conception of the social compact underlying our
Constitution, however, the Court has generally refused to extend Truax
so far. Although the government may deprive a person of life, liberty or
property by failing to protect him against other individuals, it does not
do so by failing to protect him against poverty. 151
The fact that denial of access to public property takes the form of a
traditional prohibition makes it easy to overlook the possible applicabil-
ity of this distinction. Even if government is only prohibited from ac-
tively depriving persons of their rights, that is what it seems to have done
by banning the distribution of handbills in the streets. If one looks be-
hind the form, however, it seems clear that, like a law forbidding theft of
funds from the state treasury to pay for private publication, the prohibi-
146. See Regina v. Graham, 4 T.L.R. 212, 226 (Cen. Crim. Ct. 1888) ("[U]ndoubtedly [Trafal-
gar] square had been used for public meetings .... [but] his Lordship had to say that he could find
no warrant for considering that there was any right to hold meetings in Trafalgar-square, or, indeed,
in any other public place.").
147. See, e.g., Thomas v. Casey, 121 N.J.L. 185, 1 A.2d 866 (1938) (New Jersey Supreme Court
upholding same statute). See also Fuller 1, supra note 29, at 331-34 (criticizing Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), for holding that state could not convey submerged land held in "public
trust" without referring to state law).
148. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 238 (discuss-
ing Justice Roberts' dictum in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
149. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
150. Id. at 328; see also Taft, supra note 15, at 71-76.
151. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (government need not pay for abor-
tion); Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, supra note 15, at 878 (discussing West
German analogies).
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tion is a necessary means of protecting the government's right not to
subsidize private expression. 152
The tradition of public use of streets and parks and the aggressive
form of the governmental action involved have helped to confine the in-
roads that Hague and Schneider made into the general understanding
that our Constitution is one of negative rather than positive liberties.
Nevertheless, these cases stand with Truax as reminders that generaliza-
tion in this area is a dangerous practice.
3. Religious Freedom. In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 153 the
Court applied the techniques developed in the speech cases of Schneider
and Herndon to reverse criminal convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses on
grounds of religious liberty. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts ap-
peared to equate the tests for constitutionality of measures impinging on
expression with those impinging on religion. The previous-restraint doc-
trine applied in Near and Lovell, however, suggested that the historical
understanding of free expression comprehended exemption from regula-
tions that could be validly applied to noncommunicative activities.1 54
The history of the free-exercise clause, in contrast, was largely one of
opposition to discrimination, and the Court had emphasized in its first
encounter with that clause in 1898 that it gave no right to exemption
from otherwise valid laws-such as those proscribing polygamy.15 5 Two
decisions in the 1930s respecting conscientious objectors, while arguably
distinguishable as involving government privileges, had tended to con-
firm this analysis. 156
152. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941) softened the blow somewhat by hold-
ing that the state could impose a reasonable fee to cover policing and other costs incident to private
use of public property. For consideration of the problems suggested by this conclusion, see Blasi,
Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1527-32 (1970); see also Goldberger, A
Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire" Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of
Using America's Public Forums?, 62 TEX. L. REV. 403, 413 (1983) (Because the public as well as the
speaker benefits from use of the public forum, "a proper distribution of costs... would allocate the
costs ... to the society as a whole.").
153. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
154. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 122, at 400 (noting the significance of Lovell in light of the fact
that "permits... must be obtained for all sorts of activities which are thought capable of causing
harm to the community").
155. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878); see also D. CURRIE, supra note
4, at 439-42.
156. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (Sutherland, J.), the Court held that
naturalization might be denied on grounds of conscientious objection despite its religious basis.
Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting with three others, addressed only the issue of statutory construc-
tion. Similarly, in Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (Butler, J.), the Court
held that a state university might exclude students who refused military education on religious
grounds. See Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 624 (dictum) ("The privilege of the native-born conscientious
objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the Constitution, but from the acts of Congress.").
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In striking down one of the two convictions in Cantwell, the Court
was comfortably within the established framework of free-exercise analy-
sis. Cantwell had been convicted for soliciting funds without a permit,
and the permit was to be issued only on finding that the applicant repre-
sented a bona fide religious or charitable organization. To make the right
to solicit dependent upon an administrator's "determin[ation] whether
the cause is a religious one," said Roberts, was a "censorship of reli-
gion." ' 5 7 Like the permit requirement in Schneider, this provision posed
an undue risk of discriminatory administration, and discrimination is at
the heart of the constitutional prohibition.158
Less obvious in light of the history of the religion clause was the
Court's further conclusion that Cantwell's religious freedom had been
infringed by a second conviction for breach of the peace in playing an
offensive phonograph record. 159 On one hand, it was clear that Cantwell
had been singled out because of what he had said-others apparently
were free to say other things in the streets. On the other hand, it was not
the religious content but rather the offensive form of the defendant's
statements that had provoked his prosecution; it appears that the state
was enforcing a neutral rule forbidding the use of offensive words in ex-
pressing any ideas. Thus it could be argued that the Court in Cantwell
suggested for the first time that freedom of religion not only forbade dis-
crimination against religious activities but also required religious exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws.
It did not come to that in Cantwell itself, for the alternative holding
that the conviction offended freedom of expression seemed to mean that
purveyors of nonreligious messages could not have been convicted for
using similarly offensive language either.1 60 Any suggestion that persons
activated by religion were entitled to special privileges, moreover, was
dramatically repudiated two weeks later in Minersville School District v.
157. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305.
158. Cf supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing Schneider).
159. 310 U.S. at 307-11. The Court distinguished the deferential Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), for want of a statute specifically regulating speech and revived Holmes' clear-and-present
danger test to measure restrictions on both religious freedom and nonpolitical expression:
Although the contents of the [phonograph] record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we
think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct
as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the peti-
tioner's communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no
such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to convic-
tion of the common law offense in question.
310 U.S. at 311. See White, supra note 30, at 1145-51 (discussing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919)); Taft, supra note 15, at 82-91 (discussing Gitlow).
160. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 (invoking both freedom of expression and freedom of
religion).
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Gobitis, 161 where Justice Frankfurter's first important constitutional
opinion concluded that Jehovah's Witnesses could be required to pledge
allegiance to the American flag.
If, as in the speech area, the test was whether the governmental in-
terest could be found sufficient to justify the incursion on freedom, Jus-
tice Stone was clearly right in protesting that this decision was
monstrous.1 62 Justice Frankfurter, however, viewed the case as present-
ing a claim for a special exemption from a general law assumed to be
otherwise valid:
[T]he question remains whether school children, like the Gobitis chil-
dren, must be excused from conduct required of all the other children
in the promotion of national cohesion .... That the flag-salute is an
allowable portion of a school program for those who do not invoke
conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.1 63
The problem, as Justice Jackson would demonstrate when the Court
overruled Gobitis, was with Frankfurter's assumption that the govern-
ment's interest in inculcating patriotism was great enough to justify re-
quiring anyone to pledge allegiance to the flag.164 Recognition that
freedom of speech embraces the right not to speak would raise interesting
line drawing problems of its own, 165 but the two decisions taken together
tended to confirm the established understanding that freedom of religion
did not entitle the religious to special exemptions from otherwise valid
laws. 166
CONCLUSION
Justice Murphy's opinion for the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 167
in 1940, appropriately sums up the developments of the Hughes period.
In Thornhill, the Court, over the sole and unexplained dissent of Justice
McReynolds, struck down a conviction for labor picketing on the ground
161. 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
162. Id. at 601-07 (Stone, J., dissenting). For a contemporaneous criticism of the decision, see
Fennell, The "Reconstructed Court" and Religious Freedom: The Gobitis Case in Retrospect, 19
N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 31 (1941).
163. 310 U.S. at 595, 599.
164. West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1943).
165. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (compulsory payment of
union dues by government employee).
166. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 37-49 (1962). As Professor Kurland notes, the message of Barnette is somewhat ambiguous.
Id. at 45-47. While "substantially in agreement" with Jackson's "opinion of the Court," Justices
Black and Douglas explained their concurrence on freedom of religion grounds. Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 643-44. Justice Murphy appeared to embrace both theories, 319 U.S. at 644-46, and three dissent-
ers in two different dissents thought the flag salute constitutional, 319 U.S. at 642-43 (Roberts and
Reed, JJ., dissenting); 319 U.S. at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
167. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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that the statute under which the defendant had been prosecuted infringed
freedom of expression.16 8 Several facets of this opinion reflect the juris-
prudence that had developed in the 1930s.
First, as in Stromberg, the Court condemned the statute as over-
broad on its face. An overbroad statute, like the broad permit standard
in Schneider, "readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforce-
ment" and "sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary cir-
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press."
Moreover, there were "special reasons" for insisting that the statute itself
be beyond reproach when freedom of expression was concerned. 169
Second, as it had done without discussion in holding that freedom of
expression extended to religious speech in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases,
the Court in Thornhill gave broad scope to the types of expression pro-
tected. Despite an earlier suggestion that purely commercial speech
might be excluded from first amendment protection, the Court held that
labor picketing was included because it dealt with matters of public
concern.170
Third, as in Schneider, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution
placed limits even on measures that restricted only the time, place and
manner of conveying messages, repeating Schneider's conclusion that
''one is [entitled] not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place."' 7' Indeed, as a companion case makes clear, Thornhill may
be said to have reaffirmed Stromberg's silent holding that freedom of ex-
pression was not limited to the written or spoken word, because picketing
entails expression in part through physical presence.' 72
168. Id. at 101-06.
169. Id. at 97-98 (emphasizing relation between overbreadth and previous restraint doctrines).
170. See id. at 102-04 ("Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of
labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modem industrial society."). Compare id. with Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-65 (1939) (suggesting commercial speech not protected).
171. 310 U.S. at 506 (quoting Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163). See also Mendelson, Clear and Pres-
ent Danger-from Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313, 318 (1952) ("Thornhill ... made
explicit what Mr. Justice Holmes had only implied, namely, that a regulaton of the manner of ex-
pression may in some circumstances be a serious impediment to ideas themselves.").
172. See Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940) (Murphy, J.,) ("The carrying of signs
and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying
information on matters of public concern."); Henkin, supra note 90, at 79 ("In picketing.... it is not
solely or primarily the words that communicate; the presence of the pickets is itself a communica-
tion, and indeed picketing is often effective regardless of what the placards say, because even persons
who never read the placards are reluctant to cross a picket line."); see also Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 200-08 (1942) (arguing that picketing is not persuasion but "a form
of economic pressure"); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARM. L. REv. 513, 517
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Fourth, as in Cantwell, the Court expressly revived the clear-and-
present danger test that Holmes had enunciated for the Court in the
political context in Schenck v. United States. 173 It did so, moreover,
while striking down a statute specifically directed toward speech, con-
trary to the apparent thrust of Gitlow v. New York 174 In applying that
test, Justice Murphy reasonably concluded that the danger of violence
from labor picketing did not justify a blanket ban, just as the danger of
littering had not justified the handbilling prohibition in Schneider. 175 By
stressing the importance of picketing and the trivial nature of the interest
in preventing litter, however, the Court in each case seemed to suggest
that the clear-and-present danger formula did not entirely capture what
the Justices were actually doing. In response to the nature of the prob-
lem it was attempting to solve, the Court seemed to be weighing the need
for regulation against the degree of incursion on the interest in communi-
cation; whether the relevant dangers were clear or present was only part
of that inquiry.176
Finally, Justice Murphy confirmed the obvious impression that
measures impinging on freedom of expression were now being scruti-
(1943) (responding that picketing "is generally the only practicable method of communicating the
ideas which [labor unions] wish to express to the person to whom they wish to express them").
173. 310 U.S. at 104-05 ("Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion. We hold that
the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the
sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in [the statute]."); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 153-60 (discussing Cantwell).
174. See 268 U.S. at 670-71; Taft, supra note 15, at 85-86.
175. See 310 U.S. at 105 ("[N]o clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or
invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities
of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor
dispute involving the latter."). Cf. supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing Schnei-
der). In one respect Thornhill was in fact the easier of the two cases, for the picketing ban was not
neutral as to the content of speech; it forbade picketing only for the purpose of discouraging others
from dealing with the owner of the premises or of injuring his business. 310 U.S. at 91.
176. In the brief time remaining before Chief Justice Hughes left the Court, the Justices began to
grapple with the difficult problems presented by labor injunctions under rules more narrowly tai-
lored to preventable evils than was the statute in Thornhill. In so doing the Justices revealed dis-
agreements concealed by the relatively easy speech cases of the 1930s that would make the ensuing
period one of deep disagreement over the degree of scrutiny of state measures affecting expression.
See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292, 294 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., over dissents by Black, Douglas, and Reed, JJ.) (injunction against peaceful picket-
ing allowed because past picketing had been so "enmeshed with contemporaneously violent con-
duct" that "it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence
would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful"). The contrast with Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 897 (1931), where past publications assumed to be punishable had been held not
to justify an injunction even against defamatory publications, was striking. See 312 U.S. at 319
(Reed, J., dissenting) ("If the fear engendered by past misconduct coerces storekeepers during peace-
ful picketing, the remedy lies in the maintenance of order, not in denial of free speech.").
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nized far more strictly than those limiting purely economic interests, 177
and he explained why: "Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the
press.., impairs those opportunities for public education that are essen-
tial to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the
processes of popular government." 178 Appropriately, he cited at this
point Justice Stone's celebrated footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 179 which had suggested closer scrutiny of measures limiting
participation in the formulation of policy as well as of those touching
rights specifically listed in the first eight amendments or affecting discrete
and insular minorities. In so saying, Stone had perceptively charted the
course of constitutional litigation for the ensuing fifty years.
In abandoning the old limits on economic regulation, the Court
under Hughes cleared the way for undivided attention to the new agenda.
By holding first amendment freedoms applicable to the states, adding to
the procedural components of due process, and closely scrutinizing alle-
gations of racial discrimination, it made a significant start in dealing
with that agenda.18 0 In establishing the basic contours of the doctrines of
previous restraint, overbreadth, symbolic speech, time, place and manner
regulations, and the public forum, while showing new vigor in protecting
political utterances, the Court erected the framework on which the mod-
em law of free expression rests.
177. 310 U.S. at 95. Thornhill dramatically illustrated the change of focus by holding that the
Constitution forbade a limitation on picketing that the Court had once found to be constitutionally
required. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921); Taft, supra note 15, at 71-76.
178. 310 U,S, at 95. Justice Murphy added, without a trace of the deference that had character-
ized recent substantive due process decisions in the economic sphere, see Hughes I, supra note 1. at
507-10, that "[m]ere legislative preference for one rather than another means for combatting sub-
stantive evils... may well prove an inadequate foundation on which to rest regulations which are
aimed at or in their operation diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to the mainte-
nance of democratic institutions." 310 U.S, at 95-96.
179, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see Hughes I, supra
note 1, at 554-55.
180. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 38, at 169-79.
[Vol. 1987:800
